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BEYOND RECIPROCITY: THE NEED FOR A
NEW U.S. TRADE POLICY
James J. Florio*
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, approximately twenty-five percent of the goods produced
in America were subject to competition from imports. Today, seventy-
five percent of U.S. goods are subject to international competition.'
Imports now claim more than twenty-five percent of the U.S. market
for automobiles, steel, and machine tools.2 Japan alone holds seventy-
four percent of the U.S. market for highly sophisticated, numerically-
controlled machine tools.3 Imports also dominate the domestic con-
sumer electronics market.4
Meanwhile, the performance of American exports has declined. In
the 1970's, the U.S. share of world markets fell in almost every capital
goods and high techology industry.5 The U.S. share of the world air-
craft market fell from 67% to 52%;6 its share of the world machine tool
market fell from i8% to 11 %;7 and its share of the world semiconductor
market dropped from 40% to 23%.8
The increasing competition from imports coupled with the declin-
ing U.S. share of world merchandise markets has resulted in record-
breaking trade deficits for the past two years.' In 1982, the U.S. mer-
chandise trade deficit was $42.7 billion.'" In 1983, it was $70 billion."
This year, it is expected to exceed $100 billion. 12
This dismal performance has serious repercussions for domestic
firms and their workers. 3 As exports decline and imports cut further
* Member, United States House of Representatives (D-N.J.); B.A., Trenton State University,
1962; LL.B., Rutgers University School of Law, 1967. The author wishes to thank Mr. Bruce
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1. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FINANCING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST
SESS., FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY 5 (Comm. Print 1983) [here-
inafter cited as FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 5, 6.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Press Release, Summary of U.S. Export
and Import Merchandise Trade (Jan. 31, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Summary of U.S. Trade].
I1. Id.
12. Id.
13. The U.S. Trade Outlook and its Implications. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
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into domestic sales, a $100 billion trade deficit will deprive more than
two and a half million Americans of their jobs. 14
These alarming trends clearly indicate that the United States must
develop a comprehensive international trade policy in order to improve
the competitiveness of American business in foreign and domestic mar-
kets. 5 This trade policy should encompass tax, monetary, education,
and research and development policies-all of which vitally affect the
the ability of American industry to compete in the world market-
place.'6 It should foster a positive, supportive relationship between the
public and private sectors and serve as a mechanism to create internal
cooperation and a national commitment to revitalizing American in-
dustry. 7 In addition, the United States must strengthen its existing
reciprocity legislation in order to improve its ability to respond effec-
tively to unfair trade practices.' 8 Only by developing a comprehensive
international trade policy in conjunction with the upgrading of reci-
procity legislation will American business be restored to its former
market competitiveness."
This article will examine the causes of the decline of the competi-
tiveness of American business in the world marketplace. First, it will
review the development of reciprocity-the historical guiding principle
behind U.S. trade policy. Second, it will examine the tremendous
growth of foreign competition in the past decade and the concurrent
decline of U.S. competitiveness. Third, it will recommend the creation
of an Advisory Council on International Trade Competitiveness to as-
sist in the development and coordination of specific policies and pro-
grams to improve the competitiveness of American business. Last, it
will detail necessary steps which the United States must take now to
increase the competitiveness of U.S. industries in the world
marketplace.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY
The United States' Evolving Relationship with Reciprocity
The United States first began to deal seriously with its trade rela-
tionships in the late 1800's. During that period, the principle of reci-
procity was strictly applied. The United States granted concessions
only to those countries which offered reciprocal concessions to the
U.S.2' Tariff legislation permitted the President to condition the access
of foreign firms to the U.S. market on the favorable treatment of Amer-
Transportation, and Tourism, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1984) (statement of C. Fred Bergsten,
Director of the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.).
14. Id.
15. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 21.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 27.
18. See infra notes 29, 36 and accompanying text.
19. See generally FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETIVENESSES STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 6.
20. See TARBELL, THE TARIFF IN OUR TIMES 2 (1912).
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ican businesses in foreign markets. 21 If favorable treatment was not
granted, U.S. trade laws authorized the President to impose restrictive
duties on the products of the uncooperative countries. 2F
Early in this century, the United States grew more liberal in its ap-
plication of reciprocity. Reciprocal concessions by foreign countries
were no longer a condition of access to the U.S. market.23 Reflecting
this change, the Trade Agreements Act of 193424 (Trade Act) permitted
the President to modify duties for all foreign nations on an uncondi-
tional basis.25 Underlying this approach was the belief that open access
to the U.S. market would generate healthy commercial relationships
between domestic and foreign firms. These relationships would, in
turn, promote foreign market opportunities for American firms.26 It is
this notion of reciprocity that has governed United States trade policy
for the past fifty years.27
Proponents of reciprocity legislation 28 today encourage the use of
direct Presidential action to achieve what has been called the "level
playing field" of equivalent competitive opportunities on which foreign
and American firms compete. 29 Current reciprocity proposals30 do not
change the Presidential trade remedies3' which are already provided
21. Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151; Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858 (current
version at 19 U.S.C. § 133 7 (a)-(g) (1982)). See generally KAYE, PLAIA & HERTZBERG, IN-
TERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICE (1983).
22. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 317, 42 Stat. 858 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)-(g)
(1982)). See KAYE, PLAIA & HERTZBERG, supra note 21, § 2.07.
In order to obtain the desired flexibility the [Tariff] commission suggested that Con-
gress define in general terms the kind and degree of treatment which was to be penal-
ized, but that it leave to the President the application of such law to particular cases.
The mere threat of imposing maximum or penalty duties, it was thought, should result
in equal treatment for the United States and its products without formal action.
Id.
23. Act of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, § 316, 42 Stat. 858, 943 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)-
(g) (1982)). See KAYE, PLAIA & HERTZBERG, supra note 21, § 4.04.
24. Act of June 12, 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, 944-45 (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 135 1(a)
(1982)).
25. See KAYE, PLAIA & HERTZBERG, supra note 21, § 2.10. "The Trade Agreements Act of 1934
changed the method of varying tariffs by providing the President with authority over a three-
year period to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements with other countries." Id.
26. KAYE, PLAIA & HERTZBERG, supra note 21, § 2.10.
27. Id.
28. Principal proponents include: Rep. James J. Florio, D-N.J., author of H.R. 794, 98th Cong.,
ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H135 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1983); H.R. 2848, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.,
129 CONG. REC. H2529 (daily ed. May 2, 1983); H.R. 3804, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG.
REC. H6606 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983); Rep. James R. Jones, D-Okla., author of H.R. 1571,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H598 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1983); and Sen. John C.
Danforth, R-Mo., author of S. 144, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S93 (daily ed. Jan.
26, 1983).
29. See Hearings on General Trade Policy Before the Subcomm on Commerce, Transportation,
and Tourism o/the House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 649 (1983)
(statement of Rep. James J. Florio, D-N.J.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on General Trade
Policy ].
30. See, e.g., H.R. 794, 98th Cong., ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H135 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1983);
H.R. 1571, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H598 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1983); H.R. 2203,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1462 (daily ed. Mar 21, 1983).
31. See Hearings on General Trade Policy, supra note 29, at 740 (statement of Sen. John C.
Danforth, R-Mo.).
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under section 301 of the Trade Act.32 Instead, the new proposals would
make it easier33 for the President to use these remedies to respond to
the unfair trade practices of other countries. The Trade Act already
permits the President to deny the benefits of trade agreements and to
impose duties or other restrictions on the goods and services of an of-
fending government. 34 Furthermore, the President is required to take
"all appropriate and feasible action within his power to enforce such
rights or to obtain the elimination" of such practices. 35 Many propo-
nents of reciprocity legislation believe that a more imposing threat of
presidential retaliation will strengthen America's position to negotiate
equivalent competitive opportunities for U.S. firms.36
The Limits of Reciprocity
The goal of "equivalent competitive opportunity" means different
things to the various interests that support reciprocity legislation.37
Consequently, reciprocity, as embodied in the new proposals,38 will not
by itself adequately establish equivalent competitive opportunities for
all U.S. businesses.39
For example, the major concerns of high technology and service
industries are market access and right of establishment.' Since these
concerns have traditionally been subject to trade negotiation,4 '
strengthening the President's bargaining position through reciprocity
legislation may prove effective.
However, other U.S. industries face problems that are seldom re-
solved through negotiation or corrected by retaliation. The agricultural
industry's primary trade problem is not access to markets or restrictive
quotas and tariffs. Instead, it is the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar in
the international market.42 This type of trade problem stems from in-
ternational trade and investment patterns that are far more complex
32. Id. at 729 (statement of Alan Wolff, counsel, Semiconductor Industry Association).
33. See H.R. 2848, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4, 129 CONG. REC. 2529 (daily ed. May 2, 1983)
(commonly referred to as the Service Industries Commerce Development Act of 1983).
"Notwithstanding any other provisions of the law, the President may impose, in accordance
with subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (I) of this section, such terms, conditions or limitations, as
he deems appropriate, under which foreign suppliers shall be eligible to engage in interstate
commerce in the United States." See also H.R. 3804, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6, 129 CONG.
REc. H6606 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983) (commonly referred to as the Foreign Commerce Devel-
opment Act).
34. See Hearings on General Trade Policy, supra note 29, at 505 (statement of Alan Wolff, coun-
sel, Semiconductor Industry Association).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
36. See Hearings on General Trade Policy, supra note 29, at 749 (statement of Rep. James R.
Jones, D-Okla.).
37. Id. at 497 (statement of Alan Wolff, counsel Semiconductor Industry Association).
38. See H.R. 794, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H135 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1983).
39. See Hearings on General Trade Policy, supra note 29, at 740 (statement of Sen. Danforth, D-
Mo.).
40. Id. at 749 (statement of Rep. James R. Jones, D-Okla.).
41. Id. at 49 (statement of Lionel H. Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International
Trade, U.S. Department of Commerce).
42. See Williams, Farmers Wary on Export Outlook, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1983, at A 15, col. 1.
252 [Vol. 11:249
Improving US Trade Competitiveness
and difficult with which to deal than traditional foreign protection.
Advantages that accrue to foreign competitors through currency imbal-
ances are not easily quantified or offset.
Similarly, many foreign competitors benefit from a number of gov-
ernment practices which can distort international competitiveness. Co-
operative relationships reflect a fundamental transformation of
government's role in the private economies of our strongest trade com-
petitors.43 In many countries, business no longer considers government
intervention in the marketplace to be necessarily harmful.44 In the in-
terest of ensuring international competitive ability and a long-term
comparative advantage, the private sector has gone so far as to seek
government intervention.45
Such intervention may take many forms, including contributions to
basic research and development;' establishment of special educational
programs; 47 financial incentives for individuals who study engineering,
science, math or other fields for which there is demand in the private
sector;48 social welfare and job programs which make efficient transi-
tion in the economy possible;49 exemptions from antitrust restrictions;50
aggressive export finance programs; 5I and the manipulation of mone-
tary policy to create competitive advantages for business and industry
in the international marketplace.52
In international trade negotiations, it may not be possible for a
trading partner to make concessions on these policies. A nation cannot
offer reforms in its own educational system as a concession in a trade
negotiation. Similarly, monetary policy, research and development
policies, social welfare and employment policies are not normally sub-
ject to negotiation. Increasingly, however, these programs and policies
are providing foreign firms with a competitive advantage over Ameri-
can firms in domestic and foreign commerce.
Clearly, reciprocity legislation cannot offset the advantage foreign
competitors gain through such public-private sector cooperation. For
this reason, many members of the American business community fear
that reciprocity legislation and the use of traditional trade remedies will
only lead to retaliation by America's trading competitors.53 A Price
43. See C. Johnson, The Japanese Policy-Making Process and the Government-Business Rela-
tionship (October 3, 1982) (unpublished paper).
44. See generally id. The author points out that all governments intervene in their economies for
a variety of reasons.
45. See generally id. at 5, 6.
46. See FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 19.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 48.
50. Id. at 59.
51. Id. at 35.
52. See generally id.
53. Address by Joseph E. Connor, Chairman, Price Waterhouse, "Corporate Export Strategy,"
at the 69th National Foreign Trade Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council, in
New York City (Sept. 19, 1983).
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Waterhouse survey of the Fortune 500 service firms substantiates this
point. According to the survey,
72% of the firms believe other countries are taking advantage of our
country's open trade policies; 85% believe other countries will retaliate
if the U.S. imposes restrictions on foreign firms in our marketplace
54
Businessmen who responded to this survey said, in essence, that
equivalent competitive opportunities for U.S. firms cannot always be
achieved by threatening to erect barriers against foreign firms doing
business in our own market." Although reciprocity will promote mar-
ket access and right of establishment, meeting the challenge of foreign
competition will require U.S. business and U.S. government to enter
into new, long-term cooperative relationships. 56
Beyond Reciprocity: An International Trade Policy
To successfully compete with the business-government relation-
ships its competitors use so effectively, America must formulate an ef-
fective international trade policy. Realistically, however, even these
efforts will not produce a truly "level playing field." The fact is that the
international trade field has never been, is not now, and can never be,
perfectly level. United States trade policy should work to promote the
strengths of the American private economy rather than to establish re-
ciprocal or equivalent relationships with our trading partners. While
equivalency may be an acceptable minimum standard for U.S. trade
policy, it may well be too low a standard for those U.S. industries
which are capable of developing an international competitive
advantage.
The United States must develop a consensus among government,
business, and labor about how to best foster long-term cooperation be-
tween the public and private sectors.5 7 The international trade policy
that emerges from this consensus should be implemented in conjunc-
tion with tax, monetary, education, and research and development poli-
cies.58 Only such a comprehensive international trade policy will move
the United States beyond retaliatory exchanges of tariffs, quotas, and
other barriers and toward the successful development of supportive re-
lationships between government and business.59
STRONG INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND DECLINING
U.S. COMPETITIVENESS
In the last decade, international competition has increased greatly
54. Id. at 5.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 12.
57. See FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 27.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id. at 27.
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in foreign markets and domestic U.S. markets. This strong competition
has produced a trade crisis for the United States.6" In each of the past
two years, the United States has had record-breaking trade deficits. 61
These deficits, combined with the overvaluation of the American dol-
lar, undermine U.S. competitiveness in both foreign and domestic
markets.62
In 1970, the ratios of U.S. merchandise exports to gross national
product (GNP) and foreign merchandise imports to GNP were both
about four percent.63 By 1982, the share of GNP attributable to mer-
chandise imports had risen to eight percent,6' double its earlier value.
During that same period, however, U.S. merchandise exports rose to
6.8% of GNP, only a sixty percent increase over its 1970 value. 65
These percentages reflect the growing merchandise trade deficits de-
tailed in the introduction to this article. Of added concern is the con-
current decline of trade surpluses in other areas of the economy where
the U.S. traditionally has had strong international advantages.
Declining Agricultural Trade Surplus
Although the United States has historically benefitted from a strong
agricultural trade surplus, even that has begun to decline. The volume
of U.S. agricultural exports has fallen each year since 1980.66 The
value of our farm exports also fell in both 1982 and 1983.67 This de-
cline represents a complete turnabout in comparison to the fivefold in-
crease in value and three-fold increase in volume of agricultural
exports during the 1970's.68
Agriculture remains America's primary export industry. It accounts
for nearly twenty percent of all U.S. exports. 69 Yet, the overvaluation
of the U.S. dollar, increased production by other farm nations, and a
drop in international demand has reduced the U.S. farm trade surplus
from $26.3 billion in 1981 to $18.3 billion last year.70
A Declining Share of Trade in Services
The U.S. dominance of world services trade, including U.S. invest-
ment abroad, has also been challenged. In 1972, the U.S. controlled
twenty percent 7' of all world trade in services such as banking, tourism,
60. Id. at 6.
61. Id.
62. See FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 27.
63. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC INDUSTRIES, tables 36 & 37 (1983).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Williams, supra note 42.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Service Industries Commerce Development Act of 1982. Hearings on H.R 5519 Before the
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data processing, transportation, telecommunications, and insurance.72
By 1980, the U.S. share had fallen to fifteen percent.73 The U.S. trade
surplus in services, though declining, comfortably offset large deficits in
merchandise trade in 1980 and 1981. 74 In 1983, however, the U.S. mer-
chandise trade deficit almost doubled the previous year's level, creating
a combined trade deficit for all goods and services.75
A poor rate of return on U.S. investments overseas has contributed
to the decline in the U.S. trade surplus in services.76 Nearly two-thirds
of U.S. trade in services is attributable to earnings on U.S. investments
abroad.77 Historically, U.S. investments abroad have earned more
than twice as much as foreign investments in the United States,78 re-
sulting in a large surplus in U.S. trade in services.7 9 For the last few
years, however, interest rates in this country have remained at consist-
ently higher levels than the interest rates in foreign countries.8 0 There-
fore, earnings paid on foreign investments here have increased faster
than earnings paid on U.S. investments abroad.8'
As a result, the surplus in U.S. trade in services fell from $39.6 bil-
lion in 1981 to about $29 billion in 1983.82 This turn of events has led
Federal Reserve Board Governor Henry Wallich to warn that if U.S.
interest rates remain high and trade deficits continue to grow, the U.S.
advantage in overseas investment earnings could be eliminated in two
to three years.83
The Currency Problem: An Overvalued Dollar
If America's investment earnings surplus vanishes, nothing will re-
main to offset the growing U.S. deficit in merchandise trade. The
United States would then be forced to increase exports to pay for for-
eign purchases. However, finding markets for U.S. goods abroad
would be difficult because of the high value of the dollar in interna-
tional markets. Recent studies suggest that the dollar is currently 20-
25% overvalued in relation to the other major currencies of the world.84
In effect, this overvaluation of the dollar places a 20-25% tax on U.S.
Subcorm on Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1982) (statement of Geza Feketekuty, Assistant U.S.
Trade Representative for Policy Development and Services).
72. Id. at 49-56.
73. Id. at 40.
74. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, ECONOMIC IN-
DICATORS 36 (1984).
75. Id.
76. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES (Dec. 1983)
(submitted by U.S. Government to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Berry, Tide Turning Against U.S., Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1983, at Fl, col. 1.
81. Id.
82. Summary of U.S. Trade, supra note 10.
83. Berry, supra note 80.
84. J. Williamson, The Exchange Rate System (September 1983) (unpublished manuscript).
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exports, a tax which does not affect our foreign competitors.8 5
Under these circumstances, the massive U.S. trade deficit could
only be financed by large inflows of foreign capital seeking attractive
earnings from high U.S. interest rates.8 6 Martin Feldstein, Chairman
of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, recently warned that
it would take only a few years of large trade deficits to "reverse our
usual role as a capital exporter." 7 The United States would then have
to depend on foreign investments to fuel our economic expansion and
growth. Reacting to this same concern, Commerce Secretary Malcolm
Baldrige called for reductions in the value of the dollar so that U.S.
exports can again become competitive in international trade."8
While the currency problem is the single most significant drawback
to improved U.S. trade,8 9 several other factors have also worked to un-
dermine the competitiveness of American business in domestic and for-
eign markets. These factors include: an income-based tax system
which taxes exports and domestic consumption equally, unlike foreign
competitors' commodity-based tax systems which tax exports at a lower
rate than domestic consumption; 90 a system that stresses basic research
and development rather than research with commercial applications;9'
and an educational system which fails to meet the private sector's criti-
cal needs for many skills. 92
These and other factors have begun to manifest themselves in what
economist Otto Eckstein of Data Resources, Inc., has called "a decline
in U.S. competitiveness." '93 In a detailed study of America's competi-
tive position, Mr. Eckstein found that the United States faces large dis-
advantages in key economic factors such as capital costs, productivity,
and labor costs.94 Furthermore, Mr. Eckstein found that America's de-
cline in competitiveness affects all industries, not just basic industries in
transitional stages. 95
RESTORING U.S. TRADE COMPETITIVENESS
The United States cannot reverse its decline in competitiveness by
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Berry, supra note 80.
88. Id.
89. See generally Dowling, The U.S. ir Trying to Talk the Dollar Down, Bus. WK., Feb. 7, 1983,
at 34.
90. In Japan, "the Commodity Tax Law classifies approximately 69 commodities into three
groups and levies a tax on the sale or use of the commodities. The tax on Class I commodi-
ties is levied at the retail level, and the tax on Class II and III commodities is levied at the
time of shipment from the factory." ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE-
JAPAN, 7.07 (1972).
91. See generally Norris, Limiting Japan's Access to Our Research, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1983, at
F3, col. 1.
92. See generally Fiske, Study Says Weaknesses of Schools Pose an Economic Threat, N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1983, at AI, col. 1.
93. Behr, Competitive Gap.: Reality or Rhetoric, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 1984, at GI, col. 5.
94. Id.
95. Id.
1984]
Journal of Legislation
relying solely on traditional trade remedies such as tariffs and quotas.9 6
Traditional trade remedies fail to affect the cause of our competitive-
ness problem. In addition, tariffs and quotas frequently provoke retali-
ation from foreign countries. For example, the European Economic
Community recently imposed new tariffs on several U.S. products in
response to the U.S. imposition of tariffs on specialty steel imported
from the Common Market.97 Only the joint efforts of government,
business, and labor will overcome the problems undermining the com-
petitiveness of U.S. firms. Business must enlist the aid of government
to develop policies and practices that will enhance the international
competitive advantages of U.S. industry. We need only look to the suc-
cesses of Japan to see the value of such cooperation.
The Lesson From Japan: A Process Toward Understanding
Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California at
Berkeley, one of our country's leading authorities on the Japanese
economy, described the government-business relationship which has
worked so successfully in Japan:
In talking about any government-business relationship, the issue is
never government intervention in the private sector. All governments
intervene in their economies for a variety of reasons, such as consumer
protection. The key consideration is the functional priorities of a gov-
ernment in intervening. The first priority of the Japanese government
in the private sector is not protectionism or neo-mercantilism (as in
France), or regulation (as in the United States, with the exceptions of
the defense and agricultural sectors), or welfare (as in Sweden or the
Netherlands). Japan's first priority is, above all, developmental-
meaning the effort by the government to secure Japan's economic live-
lihood through public policies based on such criteria as long-term dy-
namic comparative advantage and international competitive ability.
The Japanese government's most important contributions to the economy
are think-tank functions and supervision and coordination of the struc-
tural changes necessary to keep Japan competitive in world markets 98
Professor Johnson's description of the genius behind Japan's eco-
nomic success differs sharply from the common misconception about
the relationship between the Japanese government and Japanese busi-
ness. This misconception is that Japan's economy is effectively man-
aged by a group of omnipotent bureaucrats in the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI).99 According to popular be-
lief, these officials developed the "vision" plan which led to Japan's rise
96. See generally Weidenbaum, Let's End Our Own Trade Barriers First, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13,
1983, at F3, col. 1; Etzioni, Some Protectionism, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1983, at E15, col. 1;
Munger, America's Costly Trade Barriers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at A21, col. 1.
97. Munger, supra note 96.
98. C. Johnson, supra note 43, at 4-5 (emphasis in original supplemented by author).
99. See generally Mitusi, How Tokyo Can Regain Its Credibility, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, at
F2, col. 3.
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as the world's dominant producer of consumer electronics."° MITI is
routinely credited with unilaterally making the decisions which give
birth to new industries while dealing fatal blows to others.' 0 '
Ironically, this mischaracterization of Japan's government-business
relationship has become so popular that many Americans advocate a
version of it as a remedy for American economic ills.102 To compound
the confusion, free market proponents accuse advocates of the sup-
posed Japanese-style policies of asking the government to pick the
"winners" and "losers" in the U.S. economy. 0 3
This debate, unfortunately, has obscured the real lesson which the
United States must learn from the Japanese experience: in cooperation
with business, government involvement in the private economy is not
only helpful but essential to becoming internationally competitive. 1°4
Even though the problems facing Japan's industry are different from
the problems facing American industry, the process by which these
problems are identified and through which solutions can be developed
may be very similar.
To establish a foundation for its economic and trade policies, Japan
successfully built a consensus among government, business, and la-
bor.10 5 The United States, on the other hand, has never attempted to
develop an economic and trade policy which responds to the changes
and expansion in the international market."°
America's unwillingness or inability to reach an internal consensus
on international economic strategy looms as the greatest obstacle to re-
storing U.S. competitiveness. The United States must assign the high-
est priority to developing an international trade policy that recognizes
how competitive domestic and foreign markets have become, how im-
portant international trade is to America's economic health, and how
domestic policies affect our position in the international markets.'0 7
A Proposal: The Advisory Council
Legislation now pending in the United States House of Representa-
tives, House bill 2203 (H.R. 2203),10 proposes a mechanism to develop
a new U.S. trade policy. If enacted into law, the bill would create an
Advisory Council on International Trade Competitiveness. 09 The
Council would be charged with the duty of forming a consensus on
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See generally Zysman, Rethink Trade Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at A19, col. 1.
103. Id.
104. See generally Johnson, supra note 43.
105. Id.
106. See generally Moynihan, Centralized Trade Policy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1983, at E19, col. 1.
107. Id.
108. H.R. 2203, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H1462 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1983).
109. General Trade Policy: Hearings on HR. 2203, Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transpor-
tation and Tourism ofthe House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 211
(1983).
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trade policy. 10 It would function within a reorganized Commerce De-
partment."'I Eighteen members would sit on the Council, representing
business, labor, academia, and consumers."l 2 The Council would assist
the Commerce Secretary in developing policies and programs to in-
crease the competitiveness of U.S. industries in foreign and domestic
markets. "3 Critical to the Council's success would be the collection
and analysis of comprehensive data on the U.S. economy and trade
competitor's activities." 4 To this end, the Council would be equipped
with a professional staff and the authority to obtain the information it
needs. " 5
The proposed joint venture between General Motors Corporation
(GM) and Toyota Motor Corporation demonstrates the need for the
Advisory Council." 16 Under the terms of their agreement, Toyota will
build up to 200,000 small cars annually in California for a period of
twelve years.' 1 7 GM will market the cars 1 8 and contribute a cash in-
vestment of $20 million.' This proposal will greatly influence the fu-
ture of small car production in the United States. 120  Chrysler
Corporation and Ford Motor Company claim that they will be forced
to take similar steps to remain competitive.' 2'
110. Id. at 228-29.
111. Id. at 213.
112. Id. at 228-29.
113. Id. at 229-30.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 229.
116. FTCs Proposed Consent Order on GM-Toyota Joint Venture, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) No. 1146, at 42 (Jan. 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Consent Order]. On February
17, 1983, Toyota Motor Corporation and General Motors Corporation (GM) executed a
"memorandum of understanding" to establish a joint venture (JV) for the purpose of manu-
facturing a front-wheel drive subcompact automobile at GM's idle Freemont, California as-
sembly plant. The Toyota-General Motors JV will manufacture new automobiles which will
be designed by Toyota in consultation with GM and which will be sold by GM. The JV may
also manufacture new automobiles which will be sold to Toyota. The JV will begin produc-
tion of the vehicle as early as possible in the 1985 model year. Id.
117. Plegue, GM-Toyota auto to bow as a 1985 model, Automotive News, Feb. 21, 1983, at 1, col.
1.
118. See Consent Order, supra note 116, at 42.
119. Kelderman, Chrysler objections to GM-Toyota deal detailed at hearing, Automotive News,
Apr. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
120. Id. Before a House subcommittee holding hearings on proposed local content legislation,
Chrysler Corp. Vice Chairman Gerald Greenwald told members that the Toyota-GM JV
"holds serious ramifications for the American auto industry," and that "the sub-compact that
emerges from this joint venture will supplant the Chevrolet Chevette and eliminate the jobs
involved in building that car." Id. at 1, col. 1, 52, col. 3. Greenwold estimated that the effect
of GM's overall "Japanese Strategy" could be a loss of up to 19,500 United States jobs and
probably thousands more if the Chevette is discontinued. Id. at 52, col. 3. Chrysler Corp.
Chairman Lee Iacocca, testifying at a February 8, 1984 hearing of the House Commerce,
Transportation and Tourism Subcommittee on the future of the automobile industry in light
of the Toyota-GM JV, stated that in order for Chrysler to survive when the JV starts produc-
ing its car, the automaker will have to either "get out of the small car business and build only
gas guzzlers" or ship their cars overseas. House Subcommittee Conducts Hearings on FTC
Handling of GM-Toyota Venture, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1151, at
225 (Feb. 9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Joint Venture].
121. Automotive News, Aug. 1, 1983, at 1, col. 1. Following the announcement of the proposed
Toyota-GM JV, foreign and domestic automakers initiated discussions on joint efforts to
manufacture compact automobiles to remain competitive in the small car market. Chrysler
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Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca has described the GM-Toyota joint
venture as "industrial policy of the worst kind. It's determining the
future of the American auto industry for the rest of the century, and it's
being made by two men in a smoke-filled room. No one else is repre-
sented; not labor, not government, not consumers, not the public. And
I just don't think that's right."' 122
The outcome of the GM-Toyota venture has enormous long-run
implications for the U.S. economy. The effects of the venture should be
carefully and thoroughly considered. When the Federal Trade Com-
mission decided not to challenge the joint venture on antitrust grounds,
the proposal was cleared to go forward.123 While the venture does raise
major antitrust questions, 124 no one considered the effect of this move
has discussed the possibility of joint production of a subcompact car with Volkswagenwerk
AG, id., July 18, 1983, at 2, col. 1, and Mitsubishi, id., Feb. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 3. Plans under
active consideration may result by 1987 in the five largest Japanese automakers producing
cars in the United States and leave no U.S. automaker with a self-designed small car lineup.
Id., Jan. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
In fact, several joint efforts are already underway between major foreign and domestic
automobile manufacturers: Ford Motor Company owns 25% of Toyo Kogyo, Ltd. of Japan,
which manufactures Mazda automobiles; Chrysler Corp. owns 15% of Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. of Japan and sells Mitsubishi-made cars in the United States; American Motors Corp.,
which is 46%-owned by Renault of France, has announced plans to build vehicles in the
People's Republic of China with Beijing Automotive Works; Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., of
Japan owns a light truck plant in Tennessee, participates in a joint venture with Alfa Romeo
of Italy, and builds a Volkswagen car in Japan; Honda Motors, Ltd. of Japan owns an Ohio
automobile plant and has a joint venture with British Leyland; and Volkswagen AG sells
automobile engines and transmissions to Chrysler Corp. and has a joint venture to build
transmissions with Renault. FTC Accepts Consent Order Restricting GM-Toyota Joint Ven-
ture to Produce Cars, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1146, at 6 (Jan. 5, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as FTC Approval].
122. Hearings on Acquisitions and Joint Ventures Among Large Corporations Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House CommL on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1983) (statement by Lee A. Iacocca, Chairman of the Board, Chrysler Corp.) (not yet
published) (copy available at offices of Journal of Legislation).
123. See FTC Approval, supra note 121, at 4. On December 23, 1983, the FTC voted 3-2 to
provisionally accept a consent order with General Motors and Toyota in settlement of its
proposed complaint. The consent order seeks to prevent anticompetitive consequences from
the joint venture through restrictions on production, duration, and exchange of information.
After a sixty day public comment period, the FTC reviewed the agreements and com-
ments received and was to render a decision making the provisional order final. Id.
The FTC provisional ruling removed the major obstacle to the Toyota-GM JV, but
Chrysler Corp. has challenged that decision in a suit for injunctive relief filed in a United
States District Court in Washington, D.C. Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., No. 84-
0115 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 12, 1984). The suit alleges that the JV will lessen competition and
tend to create a monopoly in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982),
and sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Id.
The Justice Department has entered the suit on the side of General Motors, arguing that
Chrysler Corp. does not have standing to sue over the proposed GM-Toyota JV because
Chrysler moves cars in competition with GM and Toyota and its economic interest lies in
decreasing competition. A hearing on Chrysler's standing to sue was held on March 6, 1984,
before Judge Thomas Hogan. Justice Department explains stand on GM-Toyota-Chrysler,
Automotive News, Feb. 20, 1984, at 8, col. 4.
124. See Consent Order, supra note 116, at 43-44. The Federal Trade Commission analyzed the
GM-Toyota JV and proposed a complaint alleging violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1982). In pertinent part, the complaint charged as follows:
VII. Effects of the Proposed Joint Venture
10. The effect of the Joint Venture may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in the relevant markets in violation of section 7 of the
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on U.S. competitiveness in the overall international market. 125
The proposed Advisory Council on International Trade Competi-
tiveness would consider, among other factors: the impact of the plan
on other automakers; 26 the plan's effect on the future of small car pro-
duction in the United States; 27 the danger of moving small car design
engineering and production capacity overseas; 128 and the repercussions
of the plan on the U.S. automobile supply industry. 2
9
Confronting the Currency Problem
Presidential Economic Advisor Martin Feldstein and virtually
every business and labor group agree that the overvaluation of the
American dollar is the fundamental cause of the decline in U.S. com-
petitiveness. 30 Between 1980 and 1982, the value of the Japanese yen
fell twenty-five percent in relation to the dollar while the West German
mark fell thirty-six percent. '3' These shifts have helped make Japanese
Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. 18), or may be unfair methods of competition in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended (15 U.S.C.
45), in the following ways:
(a) The output of the Joint Venture is likely to be significantly expanded beyond
the single module, capable of producing not more than 250,000 new automobiles per
year, an expansion that would not be reasonably necessary to accomplish any of the
legitimate purposes of the Joint Venture; and
(b) The Joint Venture would provide no adequate safeguards against the use of
the Joint Venture, or the relationships between GM and Toyota that are occasioned
by the Joint Venture, for the transmission of competitively significant information
beyond the minimum degree reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate pur-
poses of the Joint Venture.
11. Each of the effects identified in paragraph 10, singly or in combination,
would significantly increase the likelihood of noncompetitive cooperation between
GM and Toyota, the effect of which may be substantially to lessen competition in the
relevant markets, and would not be reasonably necessary to obtain any legitimate
procompetitive benefits of the Joint Venture.
125. Federal Trade Commission Chairman James C. Miller III commented that in analyzing the
GM-Toyota JV, the Commission sought to identify the potential efficiency benefits and anti-
trust concerns associated with the venture, and concluded that the JV would provide "the
opportunity to increase GM's, and ultimately the entire U.S. automobile industry's long-term
productive efficiency." Consent Order, supra note 116, at 54.
Despite the Commission's predictions, opponents of the JV argue that at least 19,000
American jobs will be lost from the world's most powerful automobile combine. Kelderman,
supra note 119, at 1, col. 1. Chrysler Chairman Lee lacocca believes the agreement will
"create the world's most powerful automotive combine and raises grave questions about its
long-term effects on the U.S. auto market." Plegue, supra note 117, at 1, col. 1.
126. Consent Order, supra note 116, at 54; Kelderman, supra note 119, at 1.
127. Kelderman, supra note 119, at 1; House Hearings on Joint Venture, supra note 120, at 225.
128. See generally House Hearings on Joint Venture, supra note 120, at 225.
129. Plegue, supra note 117, at 1, col. 1. According to Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca, "[tihe
Toyota-GM car will have a fifty (50) percent foreign content, a situation which could elimi-
nate 50,000 automotive and supplier jobs." Id.
130. Feldstein, Adjusting The Dollar, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1983, at A23, col. 5.
The recent sharp rise in the international value of the dollar is the fundamental cause
of the very tough competition now faced by American exporters and by American
firms that compete with imports from abroad. .. . [Tihe best way to solve the cur-
rent intense problems of international competition is to reduce the real exchange
value of the dollar.
Id. See generally Hearings on General Trade Policy, supra note 29, at 609 (statement of Rep.
James J. Florio, D-N.J.). See also EXCHANGE RATE, infra note 131, at 2.
131. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFAC-
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and German products too inexpensive for American consumers to re-
sist. 132 Conversely, American products have become too costly for con-
sumers in these nations to afford.
133
One company spokesman testified before the House Energy and
Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation
and Tourism that exchange rate changes have made U.S. bids in one
group of products fifty-eight percent higher than bids from comparable
European firms. 134 Moreover, the Federal Government's failure to act
means that foreign manufacturers will continue to reap huge windfall
profits at the expense of American industry and workers. 13' As long as
the government's monetary policies continue to focus inward at the ex-
pense of trade, no amount of capital investment or improved produc-
tivity and efficiency can eliminate the cost advantage enjoyed by
foreign competitors.' 36
Business, labor, the Congress, and others have stressed the need for
direct intervention by the executive branch to bring down the value of
the dollar.'37 Yet the Reagan Administration has maintained that this
problem is best dealt with by reducing the federal deficit which in turn
will lower interest rates and reduce foreign demand for the dollar. 138
The Administration's reliance on deficit reductions as the solution to
the current problem appears even less workable in light of the Presi-
TURERS, THE DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATE, U.S. TRADE AND JOBS 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
EXCHANGE RATE].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 621 (statement of George Liney, Ingersoll-Rand Company).
135. Id. at 616 (statement of Frank Southard, former Deputy Managing Director of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, currently Director of the Atlantic Council). Mr. Southard offers this
example of the profits realized by Japanese manufacturers due to America's overvalued
dollar:
If an American producer of computers is able to quote a price at port of exit of $5,000,
but the current exchange rate overvalues the dollar by 20 percent, the foreign power
would have to pay 20 percent more for the dollars. Conversely, a Japanese exporter
of the same item would have an advantage because if he offered his item at $5,000, he
would receive 20 percent more undervalued yen. If competition required him to do
so, he could cut his price by 20 percent, and end up as well off as the American
exporter.
Id.
136. Id. at 609.
In 1981, the production cost differential between an automobile manufactured in the
United States and one manufactured in Japan was $1,500. Today, it has increased to
$2,000. This difference in cost is due more to differences in currency values than to
any other factor, including labor costs, productivity, and tax inequities.
137. See generally id.
138. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1985, at M6 (1984) [hereinafter cited as BUDGET].
In his budget message, President Reagan reaffirmed his position that reducing the Govern-
ment's budget deficits is the primary weapon in his administration's fight against an over-
valued dollar:
All signs point to continued strong economic growth, vigorous investment, and rising
productivity, without renewed inflation-all but one. Only the threat of indefinitely
prolonged high budget deficits threatens the continuation of sustained noninflationary
growth and prosperity. It raises the specter of sharply higher interest rates, choking-
off investment, renewed recession and rising unemployment.
Id. N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
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dent's fiscal 1985 budget proposal.' 39 Under the best case scenario, the
President's budget predicts a deficit of $180 billion in 1984, almost
twice the 1983 deficit. 14  The Administration's approach to this prob-
lem has been condemned as inadequate by the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM). NAM has warned that failure to act might
lead to a long-term deterioration of the U.S. industrial economy:
Naturally, NAM favors reducing the budget deficit and has urged
this repeatedly. But alone this will not solve the problem of a long and
indefinite period during which the U.S. economy generally and the
U.S. industrial base in particular will be handicapped by a dollar that
is overvalued against the currencies of our two most important interna-
tional industrial competitors, Japan and Germany. An unnecessary
and possibly permanent run-down of the U.S. industrial economy may
be the result.
The impact will not be on traditional industries alone, important as
they are to maintaining a competitive U.S. industrial base, but also-
perhaps especially--on newer high-technology industries, with their
large and growing requirements for new investment capital. NAM's
position is that the executive branch and the Congress should seek
more direct and immediate ways to help improve the operation of the
floating exchange rate system in the context of more suitable exchange
rate relationships of the dollar. To achieve this goal, urgent attention
should be given to such alternatives as increased central bank coopera-
tion and/or a "target zone" approach.' 41
Despite intervention during the summer of 1983,142 the Reagan Ad-
ministration has continued to avoid systematic intervention in coordi-
nation with the International Monetary Fund and our foreign trading
partners. 143 Only such direct and coordinated intervention can begin to
relieve U.S. industry of what the President's own chief economist has
called the single greatest cause of the decline in U.S.
competitiveness.'44
Promoting Civilian Research and Development for Commercial Applications
In the past, research and development in the United States has been
funded principally through two sources: the Department of Defense
(DOD), which has funded defense-related research; 45 and the Na-
tional Science Foundation (NSF), which has promoted civilian re-
139. BUDGET, supra note 138, at M6.
140. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED
STATES BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 1985, at 23 (1984). For fiscal year 1985, the OMB projected
outlays of $925 billion and receipts of $745 billion. In 1983, the actual total budget deficit
was $195 billion, and the estimated 1984 deficit was $183 billion. See BUDGET, Supra note
138, at 3-4.
141. EXCHANGE RATE, supra note 131, at 4.
142. Federal Reserve Board of New York and United States Federal Reserve Board, Treasury
and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations, Press Release (Mar. 8, 1984).
143. EXCHANGE RATE, supra note 131, at 3-4.
144. Feldstein, supra note 130.
145. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 16.
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search.146 Although the research has resulted in commercial spinoffs,
such spinoffs are not the principal goal of DOD and NSF-funded re-
search. 147 In the meantime, the United States has been falling behind
its major trade competitors in the performance of civilian research and
development having commercial application.
148
According to Professor Lester Thurow of M.I.T.:
It is clear that we are now devoting a smaller fraction of our GNP
to civilian research and development than our competitors. We do
well in military research funded by the Defense Department or basic
research funded by the National Science Foundation, but very poorly
in the types of research that must be done in industry but have a 5 to 10
year payoff.1
4 9
The Congressional Office of Technology Assessment also came to
this conclusion:
Not only do West Germany and Japan spend much higher frac-
tions of GNP on civilian R&D than the U.S., but for the last five years
Japan's commercially-oriented R&D has been running at a level of
about half that in the United States. Given that Japan's GNP remains
well under half that here, the implication is plain: in the Japanese
economy, R&D directed at commercial applications is given a high
priority; in the United States, commercial R&D suffers by comparison.
The same is true when West Germany is compared to the United
States.'
50
Not surprisingly, this lack of emphasis on commercial research and
development has caused the United States to lose its competitive ad-
vantage in certain industries (such as consumer electronics)' 51 and face
serious challenges in other industries.'52 Meanwhile, France, Great
Britain, Japan, and West Germany all have government agencies
which support research and development with commercial applica-
tion. 153 The United States must provide similar support for its indus-
146. Id. at 44.
147. Id. "In the defense sector, government-sponsored research is designed to win firms access to
the defense procurement market, not to develop products or technologies which can compete
in commercial markets. Commercial spin-offs do frequently occur, but they are not the prin-
cipal goal of DOD supported research." Id. The primary mission of the National Science
Foundation "is the funding of basic research, with little concern for its commercialization or
applicability to current production. NSF has the mandate to produce scientific insight, not
commercial technology. . . . [Aipplied research with a commercial or industrial focus is
clearly a secondary, low-status activity for NSF." Id.
148. Johnson, supra note 43, at 12-13.
149. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 16.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Id. at 5. "[B]y 1982, over 25 percent of the American market for steel and autos and machine
tools consisted of imports, while our consumer electronics industry has been basically wiped-
out by our competitors from Europe and the Far East." Id.
152. Id. at 6. For example, between 1970 and 1980, the U.S. share of the world's exports of
aircraft fell from 67% to 52%, its share in machine tools dropped from 18% to 11%, and in
semiconductors the U.S. fell from 40% to 32%. During the 1970's the United States lost
world market shares in almost every capital goods and high-tech industry.
153. Id. at 44. "The German BMFT, the British National Research and Development Corpora-
tion, the Japanese Agency for Industrial Science and Technology, and the French ANVAR
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tries to compete effectively.
Deemphasizing Tax Policy
The cornerstone of the Reagan Administration's economic recovery
program is the largest series of tax cuts in history. 54 A large number of
the cuts already made have been in business taxes.' 55 The intent of the
Administration was to provide industry with the capital it needed to
improve plant and equipment.' 5 6  Industry was then expected to pro-
mote its own recovery. Industrial recovery, in turn, was supposed to
increase tax revenues and thus replenish the public treasury.
In contrast to the Administration's proposals, many U.S. corpora-
tions have used their tax savings to acquire other companies instead of
trying to improve their own competitiveness.'"I In addition, the recov-
ery thus far has not produced increased tax revenue sufficient to offset
the tax cuts granted.158 The President's tax cuts have actually hurt
some U.S. industries that face the strongest foreign competition
(automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and electronics) while helping others
(utilities, commerical banks, paper and wood suppliers) without any
particular reason or justification.'59
The results of the Administration's economic recovery program in-
program all help to underwrite with public money the process of developing new products
and reducing costs in existing industries." Id.
154. 1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 32. "In 1982, President Reagan scored a legislative coup with the
passage of the largest tax deduction bill in history see, Pub. L. No. 97-34. The bill scheduled
tax reductions totalling $749 billion over five years." Id.
155. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
105.
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 included major tax cuts to stimulate economic
growth. Key provisions included:
A complete revision of rules recovering the cost of depreciable assets, called the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS), under which equipment will be written
off over either 3, 5, 10, or 15 years and most structures will be written off over 15
years.
Replacement of the existing 10-percent investment credit for rehabilitating indus-
trial and commercial buildings with a credit of 15 percent for 30-to 39-year-old com-
mercial or industrial buildings, 20 percent for such buildings at least 40 years old, and
25 percent for certified historic structures.
A restructuring of the tax credit for employer contributions to employee stock
ownership plans (ESOP's).
A reduction from 30 percent to 15 percent in the windfall profit tax rate on newly
discovered oil, phased in over a 4-year period.
A 25 percent tax credit for incremental expenditures for wages paid for services
performed in conducting research and experimentation.Id.
156. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 96.
The President said the change (tax cuts) would "provide the new investment which is
needed to create millions of new jobs between now and 1986 and to make America
competitive once again in world markets." Id. The effects of the President's faster
and simpler depreciation schedule would be to provide business with $9.7 billion for
investment in fiscal 1982, rising to $44.2 billion in fiscal 1985.
See also S. REP. No. 144, supra note 155, at 12-13.
157. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 56.
158. See Views of Martin Feldstein, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors,
FACTS ON FILE 906-07 (1983).
159. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 56.
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dicate that the tax system is not the best means by which to finance
U.S. industrial revitalization. 6 ° Instead, a mix of tax policy and indus-
trial policy initiatives is needed.
Educational Emphasis
In its 1983 report, the National Commission on Excellence in Edu-
cation' 6 ' described the United States as "A Nation at Risk."' 62 The
Commission's findings included the following:
The U.S. now ranks fourth in the world in scientific literacy, be-
hind the Soviet Union, West Germany, and Japan;
The Soviet Union graduates three times as many engineers as we
do from a population only slightly larger than ours. Japan, with a pop-
ulation half the size of ours, graduates 5,000 more electrical engineers
that [sic] we do each year;
Functional illiteracy continues to be a serious social problem in the
U.S. As many as one in five American adults remains functionally
illiterate-unable to read, write and count and, therefore, unable to
participate in even entry-level training.'63
Productivity and competitiveness depend fundamentally on the ca-
pabilities of a nation's workers. Not surprisingly, American industry is
beginning to encounter shortages in workers with critical skills such as
engineering and computer science. 164 Despite these problems, the Rea-
gan Administration has requested cuts in educational programs in each
of the last three fiscal years. 165  Unless the Administration demon-
strates more of a commitment to education, the United States can ex-
160. Id. It was reported to the committee that:
Tax policies can have some limited usefulness, but they generally do not provide
the best solution to the problems of economic renewal and international competitive-
ness. To the contrary, our current system of tax preferences and tax penalties pro-
vides a badly-targeted, poorly coordinated set of "industrial policy" incentives, which
are both excessively costly to the Treasury and largely ineffective in realizing the pro-
ductive goals in whose name they were originally justified.
Id.
161. On August 26, 1981, Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell established the National Commis-
sion on Excellence in Education to study education standards of American schools and col-
leges and to propose changes for their improvement. The Commission, headed by David P.
Gardner, president of the University of California educational system, included 18 members
from the fields of education, business, and government. FACTS ON FILE 689 (1981).
162. The Commission issued its 36-page report, entitled "A Nation at Risk: the Imperative for
Educational Reform," on April 26, 1983, after a twenty-month study. The report warned
that erosion of society's educational foundations threatens the future of the United States.
The Commission found that American students had inferior skills compared with other in-
dustrialized nations and pointed out that about 23 million adults in the United States were
functionally illiterate. FACTS ON FILE 310 (1983).
163. FORGING AN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 19.
164. Id.
165. Federal budgetary outlays for education were $15 billion in 1981 when President Reagan
assumed office, compared with $14.3 billion in fiscal 1982 and an estimated $13.5 billion in
fiscal 1983. FACTS ON FILE 431 (1983). President Reagan, for the first time since taking
office, sought to increase funding for education in requesting a record $15.5 billion for fiscal
1985. The increase from 1984's appropriation of $15.4 billion reflected national concern
about the deficiencies in education in the United States. FACTS ON FILE 71 (1984).
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pect to fall further behind the educational achievements of its present
and future foreign trade competitors.
CONCLUSION
In the last thirteen years, the world has grown up around America.
American business no longer dominates many domestic and foreign
markets. Improved international competition has resulted in a serious
decline in U.S. competitiveness.
Reciprocity legislation presently before Congress will help the
United States obtain market access and right of establishment overseas.
However, while this legislation will be a valuable addition to U.S. trade
laws, it should not be mistaken for the long-term solution to America's
declining international competitiveness. Rather, the United States
must develop an international trade policy which reflects a consensus
among government, business, labor, and consumers. House bill 2203, if
enacted into law, would provide the means of reaching this consensus.
The Advisory Council on International Trade Competitiveness pro-
posed in H.R. 2203 would broadly represent the interests of American
society, and by developing and evaluating data from the domestic and
foreign economies, the Council would effectively identify trade
problems and design strategies to deal with them.
Cooperation by all is essential. The nature of government involve-
ment in the private sector must change if the United States hopes to
restore its competitiveness. American business needs government to
nurture a healthy macro-economic environment and to adopt policies
which will address the specific causes of America's declining competi-
tiveness. Specifically, the Government must take direct action to
achieve a more favorable dollar exchange rate in international markets;
it must commit itself to increased support of applied research and de-
velopment, as well as education; it should revise tax policy; and, in
some cases, it should provide outright financial assistance to American
business.
Today, strong foreign competition challenges American business.
All segments of American society-government, business, labor, and
consumers as well-must respond through a united effort to prevent
foreign competition from soon destroying many American industries.
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